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Public Quantum Communication and
Superactivation
Fernando G.S.L. Branda˜o and Jonathan Oppenheim
Abstract—Is there a meaningful quantum counterpart to public
communication? We argue that the symmetric-side channel –
which distributes quantum information symmetrically between
the receiver and the environment – is a good candidate for
a notion of public quantum communication in entanglement
distillation and quantum error correction.
This connection is partially motivated by [Branda˜o and Oppen-
heim, arXiv:1004.3328], where it was found that if a sender would
like to communicate a secret message to a receiver through an
insecure quantum channel using a shared quantum state as a key,
then the insecure quantum channel is only ever used to simulate a
symmetric-side channel, and can always be replaced by it without
altering the optimal rate. Here we further show, in complete
analogy to the role of public classical communication, that
assistance by a symmetric-side channel makes equal the distillable
entanglement, the recently-introduced mutual independence, and
a generalization of the latter, which quantifies the extent to which
one of the parties can perform quantum privacy amplification.
Symmetric-side channels, and the closely related erasure
channel, have been recently harnessed to provide examples of
superactivation of the quantum channel capacity. Our findings
give new insight into this non-additivity of the channel capacity
and its relation to quantum privacy. In particular, we show that
single-copy superactivation protocols with the erasure channel,
which encompasses all examples of non-additivity of the quantum
capacity found to date, can be understood as a conversion of
mutual independence into distillable entanglement.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RESULTS
Suppose two trusted parties, Alice and Bob, and a malicious
third party, Eve, share noisy classical correlations given by a
joint probability distribution PXY Z . These could come e.g.
from measurements on a quantum state shared by them, or
from a noisy communication channel, which the eavesdropper
is trying to tap. If Alice and Bob’s distribution contains some
correlations that are partially unknown to Eve, they can exploit
this to distill a secret-key (a shared random variable which is
arbitrarily close to being perfectly correlated between Alice
and Bob, and completely unknown to Eve). This process
of obtaining key by previously established correlations is
known as information-theoretic key agreement [1], [2], [3],
[4], alluding to the unconditional security of the protocol
guaranteed by information-theoretic considerations, and not
conditional on any computational-hardness assumption.
A key resource in this paradigm is public communication,
which is conveniently represented by a symmetric broadcast
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channel which delivers the same information to Bob and Eve
(or Alice and Eve, if the communication is coming from Bob).
The notion of public communication is useful first because it
is a realistic one: in many practical situations the parties have
access to an authenticated channel which they might freely
use to communicate, but which might nonetheless be subject to
eavesdropping. Second, the ability to communicate by a public
channel turns out to be instrumental in the development of an
elegant, and tractable, theory of secret-key distillation [2], [3],
[4].
For example, in the one-way or forward public communi-
cation scenario (which is the one considered throughout the
rest of this paper), only Alice is able to send public messages
to Bob and Eve. In this case the distillable secret-key rate of
the distribution PXY Z (when the parties are given infinitely
many independent realizations of it) is given by [2], [3], [4]
C(PXY Z) = sup
X→V→U
I(V : Y |U)− I(V : Z|U), (1)
with the conditional mutual information I(V : Y |U) :=
H(V U) +H(Y U)−H(V Y U)−H(U), the Shannon entropy
H(X) := −∑x PX=x logPX=x, and the supremum taken
over the Markov chain X → V → U .
The formula in Eq. (1) is so-called single-letter, meaning
that an optimization over a single copy of the probability
distribution gives the asymptotic rate. Moreover it is additive,
i.e. for two probability distributions PXY Z and QX′Y ′Z′ ,
C(PXY Z⊗QX′Y ′Z′) = C(PXY Z)+C(QX′Y ′Z′) [2]. We can
then say that Eq. (1) completely characterizes how to optimally
distill secret-key in the one-way scenario. In contrast, if one
instead consider the task of distilling a key from common
randomness without any communication, one finds a much
more complicated theory, in which even the determination
of which probability distributions allow the extraction of key
remains an open problem, let alone the derivation of a tractable
formula for the distillable secret-key rate.
In quantum information theory, the paradigm described
above has two natural analogues, and both have been exten-
sively analysed [5], [6], [7]. The first is to distill a secret-key
from a tripartite quantum state |ψABE〉 shared by Alice, Bob
and Eve [7]. Alice and Bob can perform any operation allowed
by quantum mechanics on their shares of the state, while (in
the one-way setting considered here) Alice can communicate
public classical messages to Bob and Eve. The second is
entanglement distillation [5], in which Alice and Bob wish
to distill Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs from a shared
state ψAB by local quantum operations and, again, classical
communication from Alice to Bob (here too, although not
2needed, one can consider that an eavesdropper has a purifica-
tion of ψAB i.e. a pure state ψABE such that ψAB = trEψAB ,
and Eve learns all the classical communication that Alice sends
to Bob).
In both paradigms, the shared randomness is extended from
the original classical probability distribution to a quantum
state. The public communication, however, remains the same;
even in the quantum case only classical messages can be
publicly communicated. A natural question then emerges: is
there a meaningful notion of public quantum communication?
A first objection to such a notion comes from the fact that
quantum information cannot be copied [8], [9] and, hence, it
is problematic to consider a procedure which gives the same
quantum information to several parties, as in classical public
communication. A second objection comes from practical con-
siderations. Both secret-key and entanglement distillation are
important operational primitives, and the paradigm of quantum
local operations and public classical communication emerges
naturally from the resources which are usually available,
e.g. in a quantum key-distribution set-up. So if we do not
have an interesting setting where a notion of public quantum
communication is needed, why bother with such concept? In
this paper we show that, at least in the one-way setting, both
objections are not well founded, and that there is room for a
useful definition of quantum public communication.
A. Symmetric-side Channels
In the same way a broadcast channel (which sends the
same information to the two receivers) is employed as a
model of a classical public communication channel, we will
use a quantum symmetric-side channel [10] as a model of
quantum public communication. This is the channel which
maps quantum information symmetrically between the receiver
and the environment (see section II for a precise definition).
Note that although both the receiver and the eavesdropper
get the same quantum information in the symmetric-side
channel, neither of them get the full information originally
contained in the sender’s state, so there is no cloning of
quantum information. Moreover, if the sender prepares, as the
input of the symmetric-side channel, a state diagonal in the
computational basis, then the channel has the same effect as a
classical symmetric broadcast channel. In this way symmetric-
side channels can be seen as at least as a natural generalization
of public communication to quantum states.
Symmetric-side channels were introduced by Smith, Smolin
and Winter [10] with the goal of obtaining a more tractable
upper bound on the quantum capacity of quantum channels,
defined as the optimal asymptotic rate at which a quantum
channel can transmit quantum states faithfully. They analysed
how assistance by a symmetric-side channel could improve
the quantum channel capacity and the (one-way) distillable
entanglement – given by the maximum rate of EPR pairs that
can be asymptotically extracted from a quantum state by local
operation and classical communication (from Alice to Bob).
Remarkably, they found single-letter, additive expressions for
both assisted capacities: for a bipartite state ψAB with purifi-
cation |ψABE〉, the symmetric-side channel assisted distillable
entanglement (see section II for a formal definition) can be
manipulated into the form
Dss(ψAB) = sup
A→aα
1
2
(I(a : B|α) − I(a : E|α)), (2)
using entropic identities and with I(a : B|α) := S(aα) +
S(Bα)−S(aBα)−S(α) the conditional mutual information,
S(a) := −trρa log ρa the von Neumann entropy, and the
supremum taken over all channels which maps A to aα. This
expression is a direct quantum generalization of Eq. (1) and
in itself already suggests a formal analogy of distillable entan-
glement and symmetric-side channels with classical secret-key
and public communication.
B. An Operational Motivation
For an operational motivation for the view of symmetric-
side channels as public quantum communication, we consider
the quantum one-time-pad problem analysed and solved in
[11] (partially employing the techniques we developed in this
paper). The setting is as follows. Alice would like to send to
Bob secret classical or quantum messages, using an ideal, but
insecure, quantum channel which might be intercepted by an
eavesdropper, who should not be able to learn anything about
the message being sent.
Alice and Bob can make use of the insecure channel for
secure communication if they share in addition a secret-key.
Then using their secret correlations Alice can encode the
message in a way that (i) Bob can decode it in the case that Eve
does not intercept the states sent down the insecure quantum
channel and (ii) Eve cannot distinguish the different messages
if she intercepts the sent states. We assume that the key is
given by (several copies of) a quantum state |ψABE〉 shared
by Alice, Bob and Eve and the question is to find out what
is the optimal rate at which the state can be used to encrypt
classical or quantum messages.
This problem was first considered in the noiseless case, in
which Alice and Bob share perfect classical key or EPR pairs
[12], [13], [14]. In Ref. [15], in turn, Schumacher and West-
moreland analysed the case in which the key shared by Alice
and Bob is a mixed bipartite quantum state ψAB , which is
not correlated with the eavesdropper. Interestingly, they found
the optimal rate at which the state can be used as a one-time-
pad for classical messages to be given by the quantum mutual
information of ψAB: I(A : B)ψ = S(A)ψ+S(B)ψ−S(AB)ψ .
In [11] we considered the general case, in which Alice and
Bob have an arbitrary quantum state, in general correlated with
Eve. We found that the optimal rate at which the state can be
used as a one-time-pad for quantum information turns out to
be given by Eq. (2). It is intriguing that it is the symmetric-
side channel assisted distillable entanglement that appears as
the optimal rate, even though the problem makes no mention
in any way of the symmetric-side channel.
The proof of our result reveals an interesting aspect of
this task: the insecure quantum channel is only ever used
to simulate a symmetric-side channel, meaning that in the
optimal protocol Alice first locally simulates a symmetric-side
channel, sends through the insecure channel the output part of
3the symmetric-side channel which would go to Bob, and traces
out the part that would go to Eve. It thus follows that there is
no difference if Alice and Bob are connected by an insecure
ideal channel or a symmetric-side channel!
We can therefore consider the quantum one-time-pad as an
operational setting where the idea of a symmetric-side channel
as public quantum communication naturally appears (though
in an indirect manner).
C. Superactivation of the Channel Capacity
There is another line of investigation in which symmetric-
side channels have been shown very useful: in exhibiting
examples of non-additivity of the quantum channel capacity
[16]. By the no-cloning theorem [8], [9], the symmetric-side
channel can be seen to have zero quantum capacity. However,
in [16] Smith and Yard noted that a consequence of Eq. (2)
and the formula of [6] for the one-way distillable secret-key
rate (K→) is
Dss(ψAB) ≥ K→(ψAB)/2, (3)
for all bipartite states ψAB . The equation above is striking
because there are examples of states for which the distillable
entanglement is zero, but the distillable secret-key is not
[17], [18], [7] . In this way, and by considering quantum
channels which generate such states, we find an example
of two quantum channels (the symmetric-side channel and
the other channel which can only produce states with zero
distillable entanglement, but some with positive distillable key)
each with zero quantum capacity, but whose tensor product
has positive quantum capacity. This effect has been termed
the superactivation of the quantum capacity.
Equation (3) shows a curious property of the symmetric-
side channel: it allows the conversion of secret-key into EPR
pairs (at half the rate). An interesting question, raised already
in [16] and further explored in [19], [20], [21], asks whether
there is a more fundamental relation between entanglement
and secrecy in the presence of symmetric-side channels. For
instance, might the distillable entanglement and distillable
secret-key, when assisted by symmetric-side channels, become
the same? Although it is rather unlikely that this is the case
(see the remark after the proof of Theorem 8), here we will
show that a relaxed version of the statement is true. That brings
us to the final concept that we will touch in this work.
D. Mutual Independence
The definition of secret-key consists of two requirements:
(i) Alice and Bob systems should be classical, and perfectly
correlated and (ii) their state should not be correlated in any
way with the eavesdropper. A relaxed and fully quantum defi-
nition of private correlations has recently been introduced [22],
in which only the second requirement is kept. Then given a
bipartite quantum state ψAB , the degree of (potentially noisy)
private correlations of Alice and Bob, termed mutual indepen-
dence (Iind(ψAB)), is given by (half) the mutual information
of a state extracted by Alice and Bob which is product with
Eve’s state, who is assumed to hold a purifying state for ψAB .
Their actions are on asymptotically many copies of ψAB and
one can consider the mutual independence under different
types of operations e.g. by local operations and classical
communication.
An operational significance of this new quantity was given
in [22]: the sum of quantum communication by Alice and Bob
required to send their state to a receiver, in the presence of
free entanglement, is given in terms of the mutual indepen-
dence rate with no classical communication. Given the view
of mutual independence as a more relaxed form of private
correlations than secret-key, we might ask whether a similar
relation as in Eq. (3) holds. We will show that this is indeed
the case and that the relation turns out to be actually stronger
than with secret-key .
E. Our Results
Our first contribution is to introduce an even more relaxed
notion of private correlations, which we call weak mutual
independence (see section II). Its definition is almost the same
as that of mutual independence, but here we only require that
Alice’s state is completely decoupled from Eve’s. In the setting
where no classical communication is allowed, the optimal
protocol is just for Alice to split her system in two and trace
out one of them, making herself product with Eve and at the
same time trying to retain as much mutual information as
possible with Bob. We can then see this quantity as a measure
of Alice’s ability to perform quantum privacy amplification
against the eavesdropper.
In section III we derive an entropic capacity formula (alas,
a regularized one) for weak mutual independence in the
zero and one-way classical communication cases, something
that remains an open question for mutual independence. Our
formula turns out to be a direct generalization of both the
formulae for (one-way) distillable entanglement and distillable
secret-key of Devetak and Winter [6].
Our main result, presented in section IV, is the following:
when assisted by a symmetric-side channel, the weak mutual
independence rate (Wind,ss), the mutual independence rate
(Iind,ss), and the distillable entanglement (Dss) become the
same, i.e. for every state ψAB
Wind,ss(ψAB) = Iind,ss(ψAB) = Dss(ψAB). (4)
We note that an analogous equation holds true classically,
if we replace distillable entanglement by distillable secret-key
and redefine the two mutual independence rates removing the
half factor presented in the quantum case. Indeed, the rate of
weak mutual independence which can be attained classically
is at least as large as Eq. (2), as one can even get secret-key at
this rate. But it also holds that the weak mutual independence
rate cannot be larger than Eq. (2). An optimal protocol for
weak mutual independence by public communication consists
of two steps: Alice first applies a transformation to her random
variable (given by n realizations of the distribution PXY Z)
Xn → Vn obtaining Vn and then communicate part of it to
Bob and Eve, which in turn we can model as an application
of a map Vn → Un and the communication of the random
variable Un. As the protocol extracts mutual independence,
we must have that, asymptotically, I(Vn : ZnUn) → 0, since
4Alice’s final random variable must be decoupled from Eve’s.
Therefore the weak mutual independence rate is bounded as
follows
1
n
I(Vn : YnUn) .
1
n
I(Vn : YnUn)− 1
n
I(Vn : ZnUn)
=
1
n
I(Vn : Yn|Un)− 1
n
I(Vn : Zn|Un)
≤ C(PXY Z), (5)
where the equality in the second line follows from a simple
entropic manipulation and the inequality in the last line from
the additivity of C(PXY Z).
Eq. (4) is also key for our result in [11] on the quantum one-
time-pad. A protocol for sending classical messages would be
to first distill mutual independence using the insecure channel
to simulate a symmetric-side channel. One then is in the
situation considered by Schumacher and Westmoreland [15],
where initially Alice and Bob are decoupled from Eve, and
one can then implement their protocol. That the information
that goes through the insecure channel in the first part of the
protocol does not leak information to Eve can be seen as
follows: Alice locally simulates the symmetric side channel
which she would have used to extract mutual independence,
and then sends Bob’s output to him through the insecure
quantum channel and traces out the part that would go to Eve.
If Eve intercepts the state, then because of the symmetry of
Bob and Eve in the symmetric-side channel, she is just getting
the information which would have anyway gotten to her in the
case where there was actually a symmetric side channel, and
therefore, she has to be decoupled from Alice and Bob’s final
state.
Finally, Eq. (4) is also interesting in the context of su-
peractivation of the quantum capacity or distillable entangle-
ment. For one thing, it shows that when looking for more
superactivation protocols with the symmetric-side channel, one
can focus on the rather indiscriminate task of making part
of Alice’s state product with the environment. In section V
we show another connection of superactivation with mutual
independence, which relates the weak mutual independence
rate without assistance by any side channel, with the maximum
coherent information (whose regularization gives the distill-
able entanglement) achievable with the assistance of an erasure
channel. This is a channel obtained by a particular encoding
of the symmetric-side channel and is the one actually used in
all concrete examples of non-additivity found so far [16], [19],
[20], [21], [26] . This suggests that weak mutual independence
might not be increased by symmetric-side channels, which
would be a considerable improvement of Eq. (4), but which
we leave as an open problem.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
The symmetric-side channel is defined by the property that
it maps the input state symmetrically to the receiver and the
environment. For completeness, and in detail, we follow Ref.
[10]: consider the symmetric subspace Sd between two d-
dimensional Hilbert spaces spanned by the basis:
|(i, j)〉 :=
{
1√
2
(|i, j〉+ |j, i〉) for i < j
|i, i〉 for i = j. (6)
Let Uss,d : A →֒ BE, with A ∼= Cd(d+1)/2 and BE ∼= Sd, be
an isometry which maps a basis of the d(d+1)/2-dimensional
Hilbert space into the |(i, j)〉, in some order. Then the d-
dimensional symmetric-side channel is defined as
Λss,d(ρ) := trE Uss,dρU
†
ss,d. (7)
In the (fifty-fifty) erasure channel, with probability half
the quantum information is sent to the receiver intact, while
with probability half the information is completely lost to
the environment and the receiver gets an error flag. Let
Ue,d : A →֒ BE, with A ∼= Cd and B,E ∼= Cd+1, be
the isometry defined as
Ue,d|i〉 = 1
2
(|i, e〉+ |e, i〉) (8)
for all i ∈ {0, ..., d − 1}, with |e〉 ≡ |d〉. Then the erasure
channel is given by
Λe,d(ρ) := trE Ue,dρU
†
e,d
=
1
2
ρ+
1
2
|e〉〈e|. (9)
For a channel Λ(ρ) := trE(UρU †) we define its comple-
mentary channel as Λc(ρ) := trB(UρU †). We say Λ is anti-
degradable if there is another quantum operation E such that
Λ = E ◦ Λc, i.e. Eve can simulate the channel from Alice to
Bob by applying the operation E [23]. Both the symmetric-
side channel and the erasure channel are examples of anti-
degradable channels and all such channels have zero quantum
capacity [23].
Note that one can use a (d + 1)-dimensional symmetric-
side channel to simulate a d-dimensional erasure channel in
a very simple way: the sender only have to encode the d-
dimensional input space into the subspace which gets mapped
by Ud to the subspace {|(i, j)〉 : i ∈ {0, ..., d − 1}, j = d}.
In fact this is a particular case of a more general property
of the symmetric-side channel, which can be used to simulate
any other anti-degradable channel by appropriate encoding and
decoding operations.
Theorem 1. For every anti-degradable channel Λ there is an
integer d and quantum operations E and F such that
Λ = E ◦ Λss,d ◦ F . (10)
The proof of the theorem is given in Appendix A.
We now turn to the four main quantities which we will be
concerned with: distillable entanglement [6], secret key [6],
mutual independence [22], and weak mutual independence.
They are all given by the optimization of a certain cost function
over a restricted set of operations. Here we are interested in
the following classes of operations:
• Local operations (by Alice and Bob), without communi-
cation. We denote this class by ∅.
• Local operations and one-way classical communication
from Alice to Bob. The class will be denoted by →.
• Local operations and forward communication by (un-
limited many uses of) an erasure channel. The class is
denoted by e.
5• Local operations and forward communication by (unlim-
ited many uses of) a symmetric-side channel. The class
is denoted by ss.
In the following let C be one of the class of operations defined
above.
Distillable Entanglement: Given a (mixed) bipartite state
ψAB , a C-protocol for entanglement distillation is formed by
a sequence of maps Λ(n) from C such that
lim
n→∞ ‖Λ
(n)(ψ⊗nAB)− Φ(Mn)‖1 = 0, (11)
where Φ(Mn) is the Mn-dimensional maximally entangled
state given by
Φ(Mn) =
1
Mn
Mn−1∑
i=0
Mn−1∑
j=0
|i, i〉〈j, j|. (12)
Definition 2. (distillable entanglement) Given a state ψAB
and an entanglement distillation C-protocol P = Λ(n), define
the rate
R(P , ψAB) := lim inf
n→∞
logMn
n
. (13)
The C-distillable entanglement of ψAB is given by
DC(ψAB) := sup
P
R(P , ψAB), (14)
Distillable Secret-Key: A C-protocol for secret-key distil-
lation is a sequence of maps Λ(n) from C with the property
that
ρ
(n)
ABE := Λ
(n) ⊗ idE(ψ⊗nABE), (15)
with |ψABE〉 a purification of ψAB , is such that
lim
n→∞
∥∥∥∥∥ρ(n)ABE − 1Mn
Mn−1∑
i=0
|i, i〉〈i, i| ⊗ ρ(n)E
∥∥∥∥∥
1
= 0. (16)
Definition 3. (distillable secret-key) Given a state ψAB , con-
sider a C-protocol for key distillation P = Λ(n) and define the
rate
R(P , ψAB) := lim inf
n→∞
logMn
n
. (17)
The C-distillable secret-key of ρAB is given by
KC(ψAB) := sup
P
R(P , ψAB), (18)
Note that distillation of secret key via public communication
is completely equivalent to distilling a class of states γn called
pbits via local operations and classical communication [17].
The states γn are a broader class of states than pure entangled
ebits, which allow Alice and Bob to get (almost) perfect
classical correlations unknown to an adversary, who has a
purifying system of their state.
Mutual Independence: Following [22], we call a C-protocol
for extracting mutual independence from ψAB any sequence
of maps Λ(n) from the class C with the property that
ρ
(n)
ABE := Λ
(n) ⊗ idE(ψ⊗nABE) (19)
is such that
lim
n→∞ ‖ρ
(n)
ABE − ρ(n)AB ⊗ ρ(n)E ‖1 = 0. (20)
Weak Mutual Independence: We define a new quantity,
which is a weaker notion of mutual independence where we
only require Alice to be product with Eve. We call a protocol
for extracting weak mutual independence any sequence of
maps Λ(n)from C such that
lim
n→∞ ‖ρ
(n)
AE − ρ(n)A ⊗ ρ(n)E ‖1 = 0. (21)
with ρ(n)ABE defined in Eq. (19) above.
Definition 4. (mutual independence and weak mutual indepen-
dence) Given a state ψAB , consider a C-protocol for extracting
(weak) mutual independence P = Λ(n). Define the rate
R(P , ψAB) := lim inf
n→∞
1
2n
I(A : B)Λ(n)(ψ⊗n
AB
). (22)
Then we define the C-mutual independence rate of ψAB as
Iind,C(ψAB) := sup
P
R(P , ψAB), (23)
while the C-weak mutual independence rate of ρAB is defined
as
Wind,C(ψAB) := sup
P
R(P , ψAB), (24)
III. ONE FORMULA FITS ALL
We have seen that mutual independence and its weak variant
can be seen as extensions of distillable entanglement, or
distillable secret key, to a setting in which the condition
that Alice and Bob’s systems are perfectly correlated (either
quantumly as ebits or classically as pbits [7]) is dropped,
and only the privacy condition that Eve’s state is factored
out is required. In this section we will derive a capacity
formula for weak mutual independence. This turns out to be
a generalization of both the formula for one-way distillable
entanglement and one-way distillable secret-key derived by
Devetak and Winter [6].
Consider the following classes of completely positive (CP)
maps:
• RO (rank-one CP maps): all maps Λ of the form Λ(σ) =
AσA†.
• QC (quantum-to-classical maps): all maps Λ of the form
Λ(σ) =
∑
j tr(Ajσ)|j〉〈j|, with Aj ≥ 0 and
∑
j Aj ≤ id.
• CP (general CP maps): this is the class formed by all
CP maps.
The next theorem shows that (one-way) distillable entangle-
ment, distillable secret key, and weak mutual independence are
given by the same quantity optimized over the three classes
of operations defined above, respectively.
Theorem 5. For a pure state |ψABE〉 and a class of operations
C we define
GC(ψAB) := max
ρ∈C
1
2
(I(a : B|α)ρ − I(a : E|α)ρ) (25)
with
ρaBαEα := ∑
k
pk(Ek ⊗ idBE)(ψABE)⊗ |k, k〉αα〈k, k|,
6and the maximization taken over all sets of CP maps {Ek :
A →֒ a}k contained in the class C and whose elements sum
up to a quantum operation E :=∑k pkEk. Let
G∞C (ψAB) := limn→∞
1
n
GC(ψ⊗nAB). (26)
Then
D→(ψAB) = G∞RO(ψAB), (27)
K→(ψAB) = 2G∞QC(ψAB), (28)
and
Wind,→(ψAB) = G∞CP (ψAB). (29)
Proof: Equation (28) follows directly from Ref. [6], while
Eq. (27) is a simple rearrangement of the formula found in
Ref. [6]. We only have to note that because each ψk,ABE :=
(Ek ⊗ idBE)(ψABE) is a pure state, it follows that
GRO(ψAB) (30)
= lim
n→∞
∑
k
pk
1
2
(I(a : B)ψk − I(a : E)ψk)
= lim
n→∞
∑
k
pkI(a〉B)ψk
which is Devetak-Winter formula for the one-way distillable
entanglement.
So it remains to prove Eq. (29). Let us start showing the
achievability of GCP (ψAB), which by block coding implies
that G∞CP (ψAB) is achievable as well. The protocol has three
steps. In the first, Alice applies the operation
F(σ) =
∑
k
pkEk(σ)⊗ |k〉〈k|X , (31)
to n copies of her share of the state, communicates the
classical information in the register X to Bob and Eve and
traces out X , obtaining n copies of the state
φaBαEα
=
∑
k
pk(Ek ⊗ idBE)(ψABE)⊗ |k, k〉αα〈k, k|, (32)
where α and α are held by Bob and Eve, respectively.
In a second step Alice projects her system into its typical
subspace [24], outputing an error flag when the projection fails
and getting the state φnaBαEα.
Finally, Alice splits her an (which labels the system held
by Alice) into two registers a1,n and a2,n of size
lim
n→∞
1
n
log |a2,n| = lim
n→∞
1
2n
I(a : Eα)φaEα (33)
in such a way that
lim
n→∞ ‖φa1,nEα − φa1,n ⊗ φEα‖1 = 0. (34)
That such a splitting always exists is shown in Lemma 6. As
Alice’s final state is product with Eve’s, the protocol extracts
weak mutual independence. The rate is given by
lim
n→∞
1
2n
I(a1,n : B)φ (35)
= lim
n→∞
(
1
2n
I(a1,na2,n : B)φ − 1
2n
I(a2,n : B|a1,n)φ
)
,
where we used the chain rule. From the bound
I(a2,n : B|a1,n) ≤ 2 log(|a2,n|) (36)
and Eq. (33) we then get
lim
n→∞
1
2n
I(a1,n : B)φ (37)
≥ lim
n→∞
(
1
2n
I(a : B)φ − 1
2n
I(a : E)φ
)
,
which shows that Wind,→(ψAB) ≥ GCP (ψAB).
The converse follows almost directly from the definition
of Wind,→. Consider an optimal protocol for extracting weak
mutual independence as in Def. (4). The optimal 1-way LOCC
operations Λ(n) can be assumed to have the form
Λ(n)(σ) =∑
k
qk,n(Λk,n ⊗ idBE)(σ)⊗ |k, k〉αα〈k, k| (38)
for a quantum instrument {qk,n,Λk,n} (i.e. a set of CP maps
implemented with probability qk,n). This is so because any
action of Bob would only decrease his mutual information with
Alice. Thus the optimal one-way LOCC protocol for Wind,→
consists of Alice applying an instrument to her system and
communicating which CP map was implemented to Bob and
Eve. Then
Wind,→(ψAB) (39)
= lim inf
n→∞
1
2n
I(A : Bα)Λ(n)(ψ⊗n
AB
)
= lim inf
n→∞
1
2n
(
I(A : Bα)Λ(n)(ψ⊗n
AB
) − I(A : Eα)Λ(n)(ψ⊗n
AE
)
)
≥ G∞CP (ψAB),
where the the second equality follows from the fact that Alice’s
state is asymptotically product with Eve’s, and the last equality
comes from the definition of G∞CP .
Remark: Following the proof of the theorem it is also
straightforward to derive a formula for the zero-way weak
mutual independence:
Wind,∅(ψAB) = lim
n→∞
1
n
W
(1)
ind,∅(ψ
⊗n
AB) (40)
with
W
(1)
ind,∅(ψAB) := maxA→֒aα
1
2
(I(a : B)− I(a : E)) , (41)
where the maximization is taken over all isometries mapping
A to aα.
Also along very similar lines to the proof above, we get
the following generalization of the theorem: for a channel Λ
define the quantity
GΛ(ψAB) := lim
n→∞ limm→∞
G(1)(Λ⊗m, ψ⊗nAB)
n
(42)
with
G(1)(Λ, ψAB) (43)
:= sup
A→aα1α2
1
2
[I(a : Λ(α1)B)φ − I(a : Λc(α1)E)φ]
7where Λc is the conjugate channel of Λ, the optimization is
taken over all isometries mapping |ψ〉ABE to |ψ〉aα1α2BE ,
and the ′′Λ(α1)′′ in the formula is a shorthand for the state
obtained by applying Λ to the α1 register of |φ〉aα1α2BE . Then
the distillable entanglement, secret-key capacity, and weak
mutual independence capacity (zero-way, one-way, assisted by
erasure channel, by a symmetric-side channel, or by any other
channel) are all specific cases of this formula for particular
choices of the channel Λ.
The following Lemma in proved in [25]:
Lemma 6. ([25] Decoupling Lemma) For every bipartite state
ψAE let ψAnEn be defined as
|ψAnEn〉 := Pn,εn |ψAE〉⊗n/‖Pn,εn |ψAE〉⊗n‖, (44)
with Pn,εn the projector onto the εn-typical subspace of
|ψAE〉⊗n. Then for every sequence {εn} going to zero, there
is a sequence of isometries Vn : An →֒ A1,nA2,n such that
lim
n→∞
∥∥trA1,n (Vnψ⊗nAEV †n )− τn ⊗ ψ⊗nE ∥∥1 = 0, (45)
with τn the maximally mixed state in A2,n, and
lim
n→∞
log |A1,n|
n
= I(A : E)ψ (46)
IV. ASSISTED CAPACITIES ARE EQUAL
In this section we prove that under the assistance of an era-
sure channel or a symmetric-side channel, distillable entangle-
ment, mutual independence, and weak-mutual independence
become the same. This result is used in Ref. [11] to show
that these symmetric-side channel assisted capacities give the
optimal rate at which a quantum state shared by Alice and Bob
can be used as a one-time-pad to encrypt quantum messages
which are sent down an insecure quantum channel.
In the following lemma we give a characterization of states
with perfect weak mutual independence analogous to the
characterization of [17] for pbits and of [22] for states with
perfect mutual independence. We say a state |ψaαBE〉 has
perfect weak mutual independence if ψaE = ψa ⊗ ψE .
Lemma 7. A state |ψaαBE〉 has perfect weak mutual inde-
pendence if, and only if, there is an isometry U : αB → aE
such that
U |ψaαBE〉 = |φaa〉 ⊗ |χee〉 (47)
Proof: It is clear that any state satisfying Eq. (47) has
perfect weak mutual independence. To show the converse, we
note that if ψaE = ψa⊗ψE , there is a purification of ψaE of
the form |φaa〉⊗|χee〉. But as |ψaαBE〉 is another purification
of ψaE , by Ulhmann’s theorem these two states must be related
by an isometry acting on the purifying subsystem αB.
In [26] an intuitive explanation and generalised protocol
for Smith and Yard’s examples of superactivation [16] was
presented. Given a pbit, one can use the erasure channel to
send Alice’s part of the shield [17] to Bob. This process then
generates a state with coherent information equals half the size
of the key part of the pbit. Then, by considering the process
in which Alice and Bob first distill pbits from their state and
then use the erasure channel to convert them into distillable
entanglement, we get Eq. (3).
A very similar protocol works also for mutual independence
and weak mutual independence. For the latter, the αB register
can be seen as the shield part of the state, which protects
ψa from having correlations with ψE . The amount of key
is given by half the mutual information of the a and B
registers. Now suppose Alice sends her share of the shield
α through an erasure channel to Bob. With probability half,
Bob gets α. Then he can apply the isometry U of Lemma 7,
getting S(a) of coherent information with Bob. In the case
where Bob receives the erasure flag, they will end up with a
state with coherent information I(a〉B). Because Bob knows
which case happened, the total coherent information is given
by the average of the two, which is just the weak mutual
independence of ψaαB , I(a : B)/2. More formally, we have
Theorem 8. For a bipartite state ψAB ,
Wind,E(ψAB) = Iind,E(ψAB) = DE(ψAB) (48)
and, likewise,
Wind,ss(ψAB) = Iind,ss(ψAB) = Dss(ψAB). (49)
Proof: It is clear that Wind,E(ψAB) ≥ Iind,E(ψAB) ≥
DE(ψAB). So let us show
DE(ψAB) ≥Wind,E(ψAB). (50)
Consider the optimal protocol for Wind,E(ψAB). We can
assume all the classical communication is made by using the
erasure channel and that no system is discarded until the very
end. In the final step the state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve
is |φnaα:B:E〉, with the property that
lim
n→∞ ‖φ
n
a:E − φna ⊗ φnE‖1 = 0, (51)
and
Wind,E(ψAB) = lim inf
n→∞
1
2n
I(a : B)φn
aα:B:E
. (52)
Now, suppose that Alice instead of discarding α, sends it down
the erasure channel. Then the global state becomes
1√
2
|φna:Bα:E〉 ⊗ |e〉E′ +
1√
2
|φna:B:Eα〉 ⊗ |e〉B′ . (53)
Due to the orthogonality of the erasure flag to the rest
of the state, the coherent information of Alice’s and Bob’s
subsystems splits into two as
1
2
I(a〉B) + 1
2
I(a〉Bα) = 1
2
I(a〉B)− 1
2
I(a〉E) (54)
where we used the identity I(X〉Y ) = −I(X〉Z), valid for
all pure states |φ〉XY Z . Then, by the hashing inequality [6],
DE(ψAB) ≥ lim
n→∞
1
2
I(a〉B)− 1
2
I(a〉E)
= lim
n→∞
1
2
I(a〉B) + 1
2
S(a)
= lim
n→∞
1
2
I(a : B)
= Wind,E(ψAB),
(55)
8where the before-last equality follows from the fact that a and
E are asymptotically product (see Eq. 51).
The proof for the ss-assisted quantities is completely anal-
ogous. We only have to use the observation made in section
II that a symmetric-side channel can be used to simulate an
erasure channel and apply the reasoning from before.
Remark 1: We note that we do not know whether the ss-
assisted distillable secret-key is equal to the other quantities,
and we conjectured that it is not. Indeed, for an EPR pair all
the quantities are equal to one. For a pbit [7], in turn, the
distillable secret-key is equal to one, while we only have the
Smith-Yard bound Dss(ψAB) ≥ Kss(ψAB)/2 [16], which we
expect to be tight when the shield part of the pbit is composed
of a separable state.
Remark 2: The theorem can be applied to any channel
for which sending the shield part of a state with perfect
weak mutual independence does not decrease the weak mutual
independence rate (which is the case for the symmetric-side
channel and the erasure channel): for any such channel Λ, we
have WΛ = DΛ.
V. SUPERACTIVATION AND WEAK MUTUAL
INDEPENDENCE
In this section we show that weak mutual independence
is related to how much the erasure channel can activate the
distillable entanglement of a given state, at least under a
restricted class of protocols. Let D(1)E (ψAB) be the maximum
coherent information assisted by an erasure channel, defined
as
D
(1)
E (ψAB) := maxA→֒aα
I(a〉BB′)ωaBB′ (56)
with ωabB := ΛE(ψaαB) and ΛE : α →֒ b an erasure channel,
and where the maximization is taken over all isometric split-
tings of A into aα. We can fully characterize this quantity by
weak mutual independence rate as follows.
Proposition 9.
D
(1)
E (ψAB) = W
(1)
ind,∅(ψAB) (57)
= max
A→aα
1
2
(I(a : B)− I(a : E)) .
Proof: A simple calculation gives
D
(1)
E (ψAB) = maxA→֒aα
1
2
I(a〉Bα)ψaαB +
1
2
I(a〉B)ψaαB . (58)
Writing the purification of ψaαB as ψaαBE we then find
D
(1)
E (ΨAB) = maxA→֒aα
1
2
I(a〉Bα)ψ + 1
2
I(a〉B)ψ
= max
A→֒aα
1
2
I(a〉Bα)ψ − 1
2
I(a〉Eα)ψ
= max
A→֒aα
1
2
I(a〉B)ψ − 1
2
I(a〉E)ψ .
(59)
A corollary of the theorem is that there are states for which
Wind,∅(ψAB) ≫ K→(ψAB). An example is given by the
Jamiolkowski state ψAB of the rocket channel of [21], where it
was shown that D(1)E (ψAB)≫ K→(ψAB) (with the difference
being of order of the number of qubits of Alice’s state).
By the same reasoning we also get that there are states
for which the entanglement measure squashed entanglement
(Esq) [27] is much larger than the one-way distillable secret
key. This comes from the observation that the squashed
entanglement is an upper bound on Wind,∅ (a fact proven
implicitly in [25] and explicitly in [22]) and so for the state
associated with the rocket channel,
Esq(ψAB) ≥Wind,∅(ψAB) = D(1)E (ψAB)≫ K→(ψAB).
(60)
Since the entanglement of formation Ef can be much greater
than the squashed entanglement [28], we also have that Ef ≫
Wind is possible.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The capacity of a quantum channel is difficult to calculate
because the best formula we have [29], [30], [31], the coherent
information, requires an optimisation over an arbitrarily large
number of usages of the channel. The symmetric side-channel
was originally introduced to provide some insight into this
optimisation – it gives a more tractable upper-bound on the
capacity of a channel, since when used in conjunction with
any channel, the combined capacity is single-letter.
However, here, and in [11], we have seen that the
symmetric-side channel is more than a calculational tool. It
should be thought of as playing the role of public quantum
communication, in the same way as public classical commu-
nication makes the theory of private classical channels more
elegant and physically natural. The symmetric side-channel is
conceptually analogous to what one demands of a notion of
public quantum communication (the receiver and eavesdropper
both get the same information), and it furthermore makes the
rates for distilling entanglement equivalent in form to the rates
of distilling private key using public classical communication.
The similarity between entanglement and private correla-
tions was used in constructing the first entanglement distilla-
tion protocols, and has been used to conjecture new types of
classical distributions [32]. But the analogy between privacy
and entanglement was first made fully explicit by Collins and
Popescu [33] and extended in [34]. The identification of the
symmetric side-channel with public classical communication
completes this analogy.
We have seen that the introduction of public quantum
communication makes the rate for distilling entanglement have
a similar form as the rate for distilling classical key. Likewise,
it allows for correcting noisy correlations, in much the same
way as in the classical case. This gives further motivation
for the study of mutual independence, and the weak mutual
independence introduced here. It also helps us understand
the phenomena of superactivation, and more generally, non-
additivity of the channel capacity: the symmetric side-channel
has no capacity, but it helps correct errors introduced by a
noisy quantum channel, in much the same way that classical
communication allows for error reconciliation of private corre-
lations. A better understanding of weak mutual independence
9thus provides a way to better understand superactivation and
other forms of non-additivity.
The mutual independence and the weak mutual indepen-
dence also help us understand tripartite correlations. It quan-
tifies how two parties can be correlated (or decoupled) from a
third party. Mutual independence quantifies how hard it is for
the global state to be decoupled while still retaining bipartite
correlations, while the weak mutual independence quantifies
how hard it is for one party to decouple. To quantify how hard
it is for each party to individually decouple from the third
party (while retaining bipartite correlations), one can consider
the not-so-weak mutual independence, where we demand
individual privacy but not collective privacy: ρAE ≃ ρA ⊗ ρE
and ρBE ≃ ρB⊗ρE . How this compares to the original mutual
independence, enables one to quantify the extent to which a
third party is correlated to the correlations of two parties.
It thus enables a better understanding of genuine tripartite
correlations, a concept which is not well characterised even in
the classical case. This is reminiscent of attempts to understand
bipartite correlations (and mutual information) in terms of the
number of unitaries needed to decouple a state from another
[35].
The work here raises a lot of open questions. For example,
we do not even know if the erasure channel or the symmetric
side-channel helps in distilling weak mutual independence. For
that matter, it is possible that even a classical communication
channel is not helpful. It is possible, that these additional
channels are only useful for correcting errors (i.e. turning
mutual independence into EPR pairs). It is also possible
that the erasure channel is as good as the symmetric-side
channel for distilling weak mutual-independence, and hence
for superactivation of private states. Indeed, for general private
states, the erasure channel appears to provide the optimal
protocol [26]. Using the results of Section II it would then
be the optimal anti-degradable channel.
This work also suggests several questions about categories
of states and channels. Are there states which have weak
mutual independence, but from which no private key can be
distilled? This is related to the problem of bound key [32].
Can we find a characterization of the convex set of states with
zero Dss? Can we characterize the class of channels which
have zero capacity for generating weak mutual independence?
Can we use the connection between mutual independence and
channel capacity to find more examples of non-additivity and
superactivation?
Finally, although Eq. (2) is single-letter, it is of little
practical use, as it involves an optimization over a system of
unbounded dimension. Can we upper bound the size of the
register that goes in the symmetric-side channel in the optimal
protocol, in analogy to what can be done in the classical case?
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
Let UΛ : A →֒ BE be an isometric extension of Λ. Since
Λ is anti-degradable, there is an isometry V : E →֒ FG such
that
|φ〉RBFG :=
(
V E→FG ◦ UA→BEΛ
) |ψ〉RA (61)
have equal RB and RF reduced states (i.e. φRB = φRF ) for
every state |ψRA〉, where R is a reference system.
Define the state
|Ψ〉RBFG1G2H1H2 :=
1√
2
UG→G1G2ss,|G| |φ〉RBFG ⊗ |00〉H1H2
+
1√
2
SWAPBF
(
UG→G1G2ss,|G| |φ〉RBFG
)
⊗ |11〉H1H2 ,
with SWAPBF the unitary which swaps subsystems B and
F . By construction ΨRB = 12 (φRB + φRF ) = φRB and
so the states |Ψ〉 and |φ〉 are related by an isometry from
FG to FG1G2H1H2. Therefore it suffices to show how
Alice and Bob can create the state |Ψ〉 (with Eve holding
the FG1G2H1H2 registers) by a symmetric-side channel and
local operations.
Note that |Ψ〉 is permutation symmetric with respect to the
subsystems α := BG1H1 and α := FG2H2. Thus there is a
pre-image state |Φ〉RS such that
|Ψ〉RBFG1G2H1H2 = US→ααss,|S| |Φ〉RS . (62)
Alice and Bob’s protocol is the following: Alice transforms
|ψRA〉 into |Φ〉RS by applying an operation E : A→ S (which
always exists because ψR = ΦR). Then she sends S through a
symmetric-side channel producing the state |Ψ〉, where Alice
and Eve hold the BG1H1 and FG2H2 registers, respectively.
Finally, Bob applies his local operation F which consists of
tracing out the register G1H1.
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